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ABSTRACT   
  
Guatemala has been torn by class, race, gender, and politics throughout its history. During the 
late nineteenth-century coffee boom, elites expanded their landholdings at the expense of peasant 
communities. The new landowners exerted their power over the Indigenous and poor ladino 
(non-Indigenous) population, forcing them to labor in the plantations with little to no 
compensation. In 1954, the United States aided in a coup that overthrew president Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán, whose social reforms provided hope to the subjugated. The continued exploitation and 
discrimination that the natives and poor ladinos bore ultimately led to the Guatemalan Civil war 
of 1960. The civil war was a 36-year battle between left-wing guerrillas and the Guatemalan 
government, however, government officials increasingly targeted non-combatant, civilian 
populations. In the military's attempt to end the rebellions they implemented a systematic use of 
terror, annihilating over 200,000 people, of which 80 percent were Indigenous, while capturing 
over 45,000 people who were then forcibly “disappeared.” Women also became targeted victims 
of mass rape and sexual violence. These realities lead to some essential questions. In what ways 
was gender essential to counterinsurgency tactics? How did the impact of this war affect 
Indigenous women and men differently? What impact did this war have on Indigenous women 
and cultures? Were women able to resist and rise above the oppressive state?  
  
 Race and class intersected with gender, and all three were essential component in Guatemala’s 
Civil war as women, the poor, and Indigenous people bore the brunt of the violence. Yet, 
Indigenous women and men overcame the brutalities they encountered by galvanizing Mayans in 
order to unite and resist the state’s inflicted oppression. Through aggressive guerrilla insurgency 
women’s empowerment and actions, and pressures from pan-Mayan mobilization the 




“We have been beaten and humiliated, but the race was never defeated.”1 
Words inscribed on the tomb of Thelma Beatriz Argueta, a K’iche beauty queen 
 
The history of Guatemala’s rural Indigenous communities unearths a traumatic and 
sinister story of government-enforced coercion, racism, gender-based violence, and genocide  
juxtaposed with Mayans’ resistance, resilience, and uncompromising stance against 
dehumanization. It was a clash between the Guatemalan government and leftist guerrilla groups 
that ignited a 36-year Civil War. A battle in which the state’s military targeted non-combatant, 
 
1Argueta, a K’iche beauty queen died at the start of her reign in 1970.  See Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: 




civilian populations, slaughtering over 200,000 people, of which 83 percent were Indigenous, 
and over 45,000 were kidnapped and then forcibly “disappeared.” The organization of 
oppositional guerrilla groups, that were largely comprised of Mayans and the ladino poor, was 
the consequence of long-standing tensions that dated back to the 1870s. According to historian 
Greg Grandin, when the nation’s expansion in coffee cultivation produced a new liberal agro-
export state it also created “Guatemala’s agrarian proletariat that took place along clearly defined 
ethnic lines.”2 The wealthy elite minority benefited from the expropriation of Indigenous land 
and labor exploitation. A budding export economy deepened the ethnic and class divide, as 
coffee production depended more on the subjugation of all campesinos Indígenas.3 The 
dominating elite wielded their power over Indigenous communities, leaving them with few 
resources to sustain their families. Often, the military aggressively suppressed petitions for 
reform or peaceful protests, as the government saw these acts as challenging state authority. In 
the early 1980s the escalation of violence had reached its peak in state-orchestrated attacks 
against Mayans and their highland communities for suspicions of supporting guerrilla forces. 
During this heightened period of violence Indigenous men and women suffered the most 
egregious acts of cruelty as military forces wiped out entire Mayan villages, calling the early part 
of this decade the bloodiest period of the civil war. 
As Mayan mobilization intensified and anti-communist sentiment spread, the Guatemalan 
government labeled Indigenous groups as subversive communists that needed to be eliminated. 
However, not all Mayans were subversive or communist, yet their ethnic identity alone 
determined their guilt in the eyes of the state. The government implemented severe 
 
2 Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (London: Duke, 2000), p 15-16. 
3 Campesinos Indígenas are Indigenous farmers, many illiterates, who express themselves in their mother tongue. 




counterinsurgency tactics against the guerrillas; however, it was not enough to suppress the 
uprisings. Kaibiles,4 a special operations unit of the Guatemala military forces, took on a new 
strategy, state terror. Kaibiles performed calculated acts of violence on communities accused of 
being insubordinate, and women, in particular, were targeted. Mass rape and femicide became a 
part of common practice during military incursions. The government ordered a scorched-earth 
policy, burning Indigenous villages across Guatemala because they perceived them to be the 
support bases for guerrilla forces. The scorched-earth policy resulted in thousands of orphaned 
children, massive displacement, and the destruction of homes and milpas (cornfields), which 
most Mayans relied on for survival.5 
  Over three decades of internal conflict came to a final halt when peace negotiations were 
finalized, and the Peace Accords were signed in December of 1996. Part of the peace agreement 
was to investigate and document the thousands of human rights violations and atrocities that 
transpired during the 36-year war. This was accomplished through the United Nations-sponsored 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), a team that would conclude the Guatemalan 
Civil War a genocide and provide the recommendations for peace and reconciliation processes. 
The calculated scorched-earth attacks on communities, the deliberate torture of women and 
children, and the public execution of Mayans are a small fraction of the vicious acts carried out 
on the Mayan population. The Civil War in Guatemala was a difficult yet important part of 
history, because it provides us with the ability to understand a period of conflict and state 
violence through race, gender, and class. 
 
4 Kaibil is a Mayan term loosely translated as “warrior” or “strategist.” Kaibiles are a special forces unit from the 
Jungle of Training school in El Petén. Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: A Violence Called 
Democracy (Philadelphia: Univ of Penn Press, 1998), p 304. 
5 Rachel Nolan, “Children for Export”: A History of International Adoption from Guatemala (New York 




This thesis examines how Indigenous identity and gender intersected and transformed 
throughout this period, how ethnic conflict resulted in the killing of a people, and how sexual 
violence was used as a tool in this systematically imposed state terror during the civil war. 
Premeditated murder of Indigenous peoples was not initially gender oriented; however, Mayan 
women became targeted victims of mass rape, torture, and femicide. Children often received the 
same fate as their mothers and later burned or buried in clandestine cemeteries. However, 
women’s suffering did not preclude their agency. In fact, some Maya women drew strength from 
their tragedies. The more they witnessed the incessant deterioration of their people, the more 
vigor it gave them to rise against the state’s tyranny. Through testimonial accounts, hundreds of 
Mayan women attested to empowering themselves through collective action, freeing themselves 
from the patriarchal system that entangled them. No longer were they victims, they became 
angry, and their anger transformed into mass mobilization. Firsthand accounts have shown that 
their participation was never solely for the individual pursuit of triumph rather than for the 




 In order to obtain the voices of Indigenous women, I turned to testimonies that have been 
filtered through various interviewers, as most government-produced documents excluded the 
Indigenous perspectives that my research required. For this reason, I centered my research 
around testimonies provided by Mayans who witnessed or endured the brutalities imposed by the 
state. I have also examined accounts from ex-guerrillas who related their experiences throughout 




exclusive lens into the lived-experiences of Mayans, a perspective often omitted from other types 
of documents. These documents, like other firsthand accounts, are never without flaws. The 
process in retelling what transpired can never be taken as entirely accurate, especially because 
these testimonies have been put together through scholarly projects, government-funded 
organizations, and religious institutions that filter already imperfect narratives to fit within their 
agendas. Imperfection in recounting experiences can emerge, in some cases, owning to the lapse 
of time, and, in other cases, the interviewee’s goal in conveying the sense of life and death 
urgency of the period.  
 The most famous testimony I used was I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indigenous Woman in 
Guatemala, collected and edited by anthropologist Elisabeth Burgos-Debray when Menchú was 
only 23 years old and had fled Guatemala after most of her family was killed. Menchú’s 
testimony brought international awareness to the brutalities that plagued Mayans during the 
height of the civil war. Menchú related her testimony in Spanish to interviewer/editor Burgos-
Debray who then filtered and organized her words in a way that was fitting for the Western 
audience that Burgos-Debray was aiming to attract with the book. Menchú told her life in a way 
that highlighted the violence against Guatemalan Indigenous peoples, with particular detail given 
to her own family members’ deaths. She also discussed Indigenous culture and resilience, 
including Indigenous women’s strength. In the late 1990s, anthropologist David Stoll published a 
monograph that criticized Menchú’s testimony, arguing that her rendering of specific “events 
and circumstances could not withstand being subjected to the magnifying glass of social 




fabrication or perhaps even lies, especially at the hand of the narrator’s advisories.”6 In 
particular, Stoll questioned Menchú’s description of her brother Petrocinio’s execution, claiming 
that she was not present to bear witness when he was killed. Other scholars took issue with 
Stoll’s analysis, such as Mary Louise Pratt, who believes that “however significant the 
discrepancies between Menchú’s narrated testimony and the reconstructable facts of her life, it 
remains incongruous to equate these ethically with the monstrosities of the army, [and] the 
enormity of Indigenous suffering and loss.”7 Carol A. Smith addresses his rejection of racism as 
a factor in influencing Guatemalan violence stating, “[r]acism accounts for the nature of the final 
solution in the 1980s the huge massacres of Indigenous people.”8 Despite the imperfect 
testimony Menchú gave of her family there has been a substantial amount of firsthand accounts 
that reflect the same monstrosities Menchú illustrates. 
Burgos-Debray’s publication of Menchú’s primary source was a useful tool when 
combined with others, corroborating primary source testimony about how the state 
systematically organized attacks on the Mayan population. One of these resulted from 
Guatemala’s Truth Commission reports, the United Nation-sponsored Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH). Following the Peace Accord agreement in1996 the CEH was officially 
established and went on for two years after which its final report was printed in 1999, titled 
Guatemala: Memory of Silence (Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio). I obtained the final report of 
the CEH in English and Spanish from separate government websites. The Spanish CEH report 
offers a complete report of 4,383 human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the 
 
6 W. George Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, “The Primacy of Larger Truths,” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta 
Menchú Controversy (Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p 172. 
7 Mary Louise Pratt, “I, Rigoberta Menchú and the ‘Culture Wars,’” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta Menchú 
Controversy (Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p 45. 
8 Carol A. Smith, “Why Write Expose of Rigoberta Menchú?” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta Menchú 




armed conflict as opposed to the 82-page English volume, which was limited to the conclusion 
and recommendations of their findings. I used these documents for firsthand accounts of 
Indigenous civilians to find information on violence against women, detailed evidence of 
insurgents and counterinsurgents, the state’s role and strategies, and statistical data to support the 
impact Mayans as a whole encountered, but specifically regarding violence towards women. I 
was also able to extract pieces of the CEH’s findings from two of my secondary sources, which 
were organized by summarizing scenes and attaching testimonies.9 The narrowing down of 
topics within these sources, such as gender, torture and murders, state power and military 
formation that were then linked with primary documents, allowed me to maneuver more readily 
through information and grasp the context in which these CEH records support.  
The Roman Catholic archdiocese’s project for the Recovery of Historical Memory 
(REMHI) was developed for the purpose of “reconstructing the history of pain and death, 
understanding the reasons for it, the why and the how.”10 This project was coordinated by 
Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human Rights Office (ODHAG) under the leadership of Bishop Juan 
Gerardi Conedera and printed in 1998. It is made up of 5,465 testimonies including 52,427 
documented victims of human rights and humanitarian violation, for which the church wanted to 
seek peace, justice and reconciliation.11 The testimonies I used gave me the ability to convey the 
horrific carnage that was encompassed by the civil war. I used the English abridged book 
 
9 A significant amount of CEH documents were found in two of my secondary sources: Greg Grandin, Who is 
Rigoberta Menchú? (New York: Verso, 2011), and Etelle Higonnet, Quiet Genocide: Guatemala 1981-1983 
(London: Transaction,2009). 
10 REMHI, Recovery of Historical Memory Project; The official report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of 
Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, (London: Orbis Books, 1999), p xxii. 
11 REMHI, Guatemala: Never Again!, 




Guatemala: Never Again!, for information about violence against Indigenous women and 
children, as well as Indigenous women’s resistance and empowerment.12  
 Contrary to my other primary sources, Memorias Rebeldes Contra el Olvido is a book 
composed of collected testimonies of ex-combatant women. It was published by a group of 
women from the feminist publication La Cuerda; Plataforma Agraria, a political alliance 
committed to building a social movement, and the research center La Asociación para el Avance 
de las Ciencias Sociales (AVANCSO).13 All these women were part of the rebel guerrilla group 
Army of the Poor (EGP) a group that by 1982 had merged along with three other guerrilla groups 
to form a united front under Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). These women 
asked compañeras from AVANCSO and Plataforma Agraria about putting a narrative together 
concerning Indigenous women’s struggle and what the war represented for them. Some 
interviewers faced a language barrier, as some interviews were given in Spanish and others in 
their native tongue. I must point out again that these interviews were filtered two to three times 
over after being funneled through interpreters, interviewers, and editors. Nonetheless, the 
 
12 Further material was found on women, children, and the disintegration of Indigenous family in Rachel Nolan’s 
“Children for Export”: A History of International Adoption from Guatemala, (New York University: PhD diss., 
2018). Nolan’s research aided me further in analyzing the state’s use of psychological violence on Indigenous 
mothers as a form of torture in their ploy to remove children from families and place them up for adoption. Nolan 
exposes the states racist angle for adopting Indigenous children out of Guatemala….  
13 Rosalinda Hernández Alarcón, Memorias Rebeldes Contra el Olvido (Guatemala: Cuerda, 2008), p 12.  
Detailed description of those groups who took part in compiling this book of testimonies of ex-combatants Maya 
women was in the rear inner fold of this book. La Cuerda is a Guatemalan association of diverse women who adhere 
to feminism, understood as a philosophical and political theory of analysis, a political practice in favor of social 
transformation and a lifestyle and being that in general seek to eliminate discrimination and raise equality between 
women and brothers, between ethnicities and diverse social groups. Plataforma Agraria is a political, diverse and 
multisectoral alliance committed to building a social movement that fights for structural agrarian changes and rural 
development, that is capable of linking specific demands with national agendas, as well as interweaving local 
dynamics with international ones. maintains a critical stance against government agendas and promotes political 
initiatives to achieve progress in favor of the excluded majority. AVANCSO is private non-profit institution, whose 
mission is to contribute, through its research institute, to the understanding of the most significant problems of the 





testimonies I used supported my questions concerning gender-based violence, guerrilla life for 
Indigenous women, intersecting roles of men and women, and women’s agency. 
While these aforementioned sources have gone through a variety of filters, Victor 
Montejo’s Testimony: Death of a Guatemalan Village is the one primary source that was 
composed and published by the person testifying. Montejo was a ladino schoolteacher, and 
though he sympathized with Mayan people, his perspective of the events that unfolded in the 
remote village of Tzalala in northwest Huehuetenango was not the voice I most needed for my 
research. It was, nonetheless, a useful instrument in providing me with detailed accounts of the 
unjust military executions, unsubstantiated accusations of innocent villagers labeled “internal 
enemy,” brutal public execution, and civil patrol (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil or PAC Spanish 
acronym) compliance in the murdering and torturing of their Indigenous counterparts under the 
orders of the military agents. Montejo’s experience of being taken by the military also gave 
documentation about his experience in the barracks, the state control over him after his release, 
and different treatment he received for being a ladino from the city.  
Secondary Sources 
 The secondary sources I used cover a range of periods within Guatemalan history, which 
allowed me to better understand the baseline of what drove this war into the direction of gender 
violence, geared towards women and ultimately genocide. While much has been written about 
the Indigenous history of Guatemala, I selected a few sources from the premier historian of 
modern Guatemalan history, Greg Grandin. Grandin’s Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race 




eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, which concentrates on the Maya-K’iche’14 of 
Quetzaltenango, a city in Guatemala’s western highlands. Grandin goes through critical points of 
Guatemala’s past that aided me in analyzing the ethnic division, class struggle, as well as the 
“social and political restructuring that heavily contested the authority of landed elite in 1944 and 
the fall of president Jacobo Árbenz in 1954.”15 Though Grandin’s book was useful in his 
discussion about gender roles with the K’iche’ community as wells as Indigenous women and 
national identity, it lacked the in-depth analysis of Indigenous women’s lives that I needed. 
  Whereas Grandin lacked Indigenous women, David Carey Jr.’s, Engendering Mayan 
History: Kaqchikel Women as Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970, captured the 
“marginal histories and hidden forces” of Kaqchikel16 women.17 Carey’s desire to bring attention 
to the often omitted contributions of Maya women to national histories from their perspectives, 
in their own voices was important to my work because it provided a more complete picture of 
Indigenous life, specifically women’s contribution within Mayan communities. The 250 oral 
histories collected by Carey and his Kaqchikel research assistants displayed women’s tendency 
to defy gender codes, taking on male characteristics and roles spearheaded their mobility within 
their communities and even into ladino life. This book gave me the history of how Indigenous 
women contributed to the shaping Guatemala’s past. 
In her book The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, Jennifer 
Schirmer states that an examination of the Guatemalan military “serves as a window onto the 
 
14 Maya-K’iche’ people are one of the 22 different Mayan ethnic groups from the Western Highlands of Guatemala. 
Indigenous groups in Guatemala are not only separated by different Indigenous languages and cultures. 
15 Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala, p7. 
16 Kaqchikel people were Mayans from the midwestern highlands of Guatemala whose native language was the third 
most common language in Guatemala.  
17 David Carey Jr, Engendering Mayan History: Kaqchikel Women as Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970 




internal workings and thinking of the most powerful, least researched, and least understood 
institution in Guatemala.”18 Schirmer’s research provides the military’s perspective of the war, 
based on the interviews that she conducted with individuals ranging from former heads of state, 
defense ministers, military officers, congressional deputies, lawyers, and journalists from 1986 to 
1996. Schirmer’s work gave me the detailed background into the Guatemalan military and its 
intellectual evolution and strategic transition. This monograph was an important part in my 
analysis of the state’s counterinsurgency tactics from first-hand accounts of the state’s most 
powerful and influential forces starting from the October Revolution of 1944 through the late 
1980s. 
 Betsy Konefal’s For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism In Guatemala, 
1960- 1990, examined Mayan participation in the development of oppositional political activism 
and offers a look into Maya mass mobilization as well as their role in civil war. She provides an 
understanding Indigenous identity, the discriminatory social relations between the ladinos and 
Mayans. Konefal’s discussion concerning the Catholic church’s role in spearheading pan-Mayan 
mobilization was key to grasping how impactful the church along with their new teachings of 
Liberation Theology19 was in rural Mayan communities and in the war throughout the 1960s-
70s.20 Konefal also discussed the Panzós massacre of 1978, which not only intensified resistance, 
but raised issues of national identity, which she explored via Indigenous beauty queens.  
 
18 Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: Univ of 
Penn Press, 1998), p 1. 
19 Liberation Theology was a new Catholic religious movement, based on the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) 
and the Episcopal Conference of Medellín (1968), in which priests and nuns aligned themselves with the poor and 
oppressed in pursuit of social justice through social action and rural community empowerment. 
20 Betsy Konefal, For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala 1960-1990 (Albuquerque: 




 Both Cindy Forster’s articles “Violent and Violated Women: Justice and Gender in Rural 
Guatemala, 1936-1956” and “Me di Cuenta de Que Sí Podemos: Mujeres Indígenas y 
Campesinas en La Revolución Guatemalteca, 1970-2000” expose the violent nature of the state 
towards Indigenous women while also illustrating how women resisted oppression, patriarchal 
norms, and empowered themselves through the most traumatic condition. “Violent and Violated 
Women” gave me an insight into violence that had already been around long before the civil war 
began in 1960, and how inalienable rights were denied to women, who had no right to physical 
privacy.21 The article “Me di Cuenta” provided evidence of Indigenous women’s empowerment. 
Former women combatants shared their experiences and how they transformed pain into power. 
They no longer adhered to the patriarchal idea of women’s submissive position, men and women 
became one in the struggle against the ladino state. 
Some works combined secondary and primary sources. Greg Grandin’s Who is Rigoberta 
Menchú? was composed in defense Menchú’s testimony in contradiction of “the intellectual 
apologist of the world’s most powerful nation,” and directly criticized American anthropologist 
David Stoll, who saw her as merely “an Indian with an agenda.”22 In addition, this book’s second 
half focused on “Clarifying History” and “Judging Genocide” through a host of document 
excerpts from Commission for Historical Clarification’s (CEH). In all, Grandin’s work 
contributed in understanding and analyzing Stoll’s controversy while the CEH documents 
provided more primary-source evidence with a different voice. The Guatemala Reader, contains 
a wealth of information from scholars that allowed me to fill in any gaps from my other sources. 
For example, McCreery’s essay “Land, Labor, and Community,” in combination with Cindy 
 
21 Cindy Foster, "Violent and Violated Women: Justice and Gender in Rural Guatemala, 1936-195?," Journal of 
Women's History 11, no. 3 (1999), p 75. 




Forster’s monograph allowed me to explain the history of coffee exports, Indigenous labor, and 
land reform. 
Synopsis of the Civil War, Terror, and Genocide 
 
 “Let the history we lived be taught in the schools, so that it is never forgotten, so our children 
may know it.” – A CEH Witness23 
 
Historian Betsy Konefal indicates that 80 percent of those who were massacred and 
disappeared in the armed conflict that began in 1960 were Mayan, and approximately 93 percent 
of these victims were killed at the hands of the state.24  A death toll not at all surprising to the 
Guatemalan government who created the institutional structures [the military] that, according to 
Jennifer Schirmer,  “allowed them to undertake the dual objectives of repression and 
consolidation, of warmaking and statecrafting, and of strengthening internal repressive 
capacities…while self-consciously speaking about autonomy from the oligarchy and lack of 
responsibility for human rights violations.”25 But what created such revulsion for a race that 
constituted a majority of Guatemala's population? It must be understood that during the Spanish 
conquest and subsequent colonization, Spanish colonizers fostered an environment of exclusion, 
antagonism, and conflict towards Indigenous peoples.  These conditions and sentiments carried 
over into its independence. It was the ambition and greed of Guatemala's liberal oligarchs of the 
mid to late nineteenth century that exacerbated the racist precepts that Spanish conquerors used 
to rationalize the containment of Mayans.26 The liberal elite class focused less on political liberty 
and more on economic progress.27 The progress manifested through coffee cultivation and 
 
23 This quote was taken from a testimony given to the CEH (author unknown). CEH, p 10. 
24 Betsy Konefal, For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala 1960-1990 (Albuquerque: 
Univ of New Mexico Press, 2010), p 13. 
25  Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 2. 
26 Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú?, p 102.  
27 Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala’s October Revolution (Pittsburg: 




export, which objectified an entire race. In essence, coffee was ultimately the catalyst that led to 
one of the bloodiest civil wars in Latin America that ravaged a people. As Grandin points out 
“[w]ithout an export crop, Guatemala’s pre-coffee economy did not integrate Indians, in however 
exploitive a fashion, into colonial society.”28 In part, Mayans were given the space to subsist as 
Mayans. However, as coffee fincas began springing up and the demand for exports rose, Liberal 
elites became increasingly frustrated with Carrera's conservative regime impeding on their 
economic wealth. Cultivation required intense labor and land to create a “profitable enterprise.”29 
Yet, Conservatives were geared toward protecting Mayans. In 1865, the Gaceta de Guatemala 
informed the public that the government's job “was to protect Indians and to improve their 
spiritual and material situation; they should be 'moralized' with 'kindness' and prudence.”30 By 
1871, as historian Cindy Forster explains, alliance between “consummate politician and 
merchant Miguel Garcia Granados and San Marcos [planter] Justo Rufino Barrios, along with 
Guatemala city’s merchant class, solidified Liberals support to take down the conservative 
regime.31  
Many historians have noted the important connection between the economics of coffee 
and the politics of nineteenth-century liberalism. Following the Liberal takeover, Granados, a 
gradual reformist, took office for a short term before the more rigid Liberal dictator Justo Rufino 
Barrios seized power in 1873. Cindy Forster notes that under Barrios’ reign “coffee became 
Guatemala’s chief export and the state’s main source of income.”32 Likewise, David McCreery 
 
28 Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú?,  p 127. 
29 David McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community in Grandin, Greg, Deborah Levenson-Estrada, and Elizabeth 
Oglesby, eds., The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2011), p 
118. 
30 David McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 118. 
31 Forster, The Time of Freedom, p 14. 




noted that the coffee boom led to a series of laws that were directed “at breaking the autonomy of 
Indigenous communities.”33 Mandamientos (forced labor laws) were implemented as plantation 
owners and wealthy elites believed Mayans “ha[d] to be made to work, and work hard,” and the 
expropriation of land was needed to continue spreading coffee cultivation as the demand for 
export increased. “Coffee provided,” as McCreery states, “the motive and the means for 
Guatemala state to penetrate the Indigenous community to an unprecedented degree, and it 
destroyed much of what remained of values shared between the elite and mass population.”34 
Mayans were essential in making coffee a success, and thus the prosperity of the elites. 
McCreery further explains that for Liberal elites, “what Indians thought mattered far less, if it 
mattered at all, than that they should be readily and cheaply available for work in the coffee 
groves; the growers wanted their bodies not their minds.”35  
Another labor-intensive business was established 1901 when, under President Manuel 
Estrada Cabrera’s reign (1898 to 1920), Guatemala and the United Fruit Company (UFCO), a 
US-based business, signed a pact for banana production. Cabrera granted the UFCO substantial 
concessions, which included 110,355 acres of land and an export tax exemption for 35 years for 
the construction of the Guatemalan City railway.36 By 1920, REMHI notes that “the United 
States provided 70 percent of Guatemalan imports and controlled 80 percent of its exports 
dubbing the company El Pulpo37 (The Octopus).38 Tensions intensified between the Indigenous 
population and the landowners following the end of Barrios’s rule and through Cabrera’s time in 
 
33 McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 117. 
34 McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p119. 
35 McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 120. 
36 REMHI, Recovery of Historical Memory Project; The official report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of 
Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, (London: Orbis Books, 1999), p 182. 
37 El Pulpo (The Octopus) was a nickname given because by the late 1920s UFCO had its tentacle in nearly every 
economic and political development causing major unrest due to the harsh exploitation of Indigenous and 
poor as well as those who suffered expropriation of land for their benefit. 




office. Historians have thus concluded that Cabrera’s aim was parallel to Barrios’s pursuit in 
wealth inequality.39 
  Rule under Dictator Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1931 to 1944) did not alleviate the pressure 
Mayans endured. Like Barrios and Cabrera, Ubicio led an autocratic administration. Although he 
did away with debt peonage, he imposed vagrancy laws. In 1934, new vagrancy laws forced men 
to work for 100 to 150 days out of the year based on their land holdings.40 Cards were issued for 
all men to carry on their persons to prove that they had completed their assigned duties. Men had 
to work on state projects, such as constructing roads without machinery, with no pay or 
provisions.41 Women were not recruited by the state, yet the state was dependent on them. Amid 
having to shift their roles as wives and mothers to be the sole providers for their families while 
their husbands were away, Indigenous women were now responsible for making tortillas and 
tamales for the workers without pay. As David Carey points out, the most marginalized group 
was to “provide the very sustenance that energized the workforce, female food production fueled 
Guatemala’s infrastructure development.”42 Resistance of Indigenous women becomes more 
evident during this period. This order was an unspoken recognition of what an indispensable role 
women played in the success of public work projects.43 Even as they held the status of the most 
relegated groups (Maya women), by challenging the state’s order they agitated the state in such a 
way that it was obliged to acknowledge them, if not value their compulsory labor. 44  
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  The October Revolution of 1944, a pro-democracy movement of teachers, students, 
military reformers, and emerging middle classes, brought down the 13-year dictatorship of Jorge 
Ubico and his brief successor, Fredrico Ponce.45 Throughout this revolutionary period, also 
known as the Ten Years of Spring, democratically elected presidents Juan José Arévalo (1944- 
1951) and Jacobo Árbenz (1951-1954) provided a sense of freedom and hope for the Indigenous 
and poor ladino population through a series of reforms.46 This period saw an increase in the 
number of organizations for workers and entrepreneurs, increased salaries, and well-paid 
leadership positions throughout the state. According to anthropologist Jennifer Schirmer, it was 
also during this period that the consolidation of political and military powers first began, 
impeding on any legislature that encroached in any way on the army’s political territory.47 
Schirmer also points out that the Constitution 1945 transformed the Guatemalan army into a 
powerhouse organization allowing them to install a Consejo Superior de Defensa Nacional 
(Superior Council of National Defense) which lawfully divided the army and government in turn 
consenting to the army’s sovereignty in both its command and mission.48 As quoted in Schirmer, 
the Council was a “consulting organization charged with resolving issues related to the 
functioning of the army and [that would] act as the Superior Tribunal of the army … to judge and 
know matters convocated by the President, Defense Minister or Chief of the Armed Forces.”49 In 
addition, the Constitution noted that dealings pertaining to the “functioning of the army” also 
meant protecting “ the rights and freedom of the nation,” “guaranteeing democracy,” and 
protecting “ laws and social and political institutions of the country.”50 Schirmer identifies these 
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provisions as “abstract” and “nonelaborated,” “allow[ing] arbitrary and even contradictory 
application.”51  
However, the reform that created the most change and would consequently end this 
period of transformation was the enactment of Árbenz’s Decree 900. Decree 900 was an agrarian 
reform law intended to expropriate and redistribute uncultivated land from the largest 
landholders while also eliminating forced labor. By 1944 the UFCO was the largest landowner in 
Guatemala, with over 180,000 acres of land. Hence, these new agrarian reforms placed US 
businessmen at a great disadvantage, as they not only depended heavily on the cheap labor, but 
under Arbenz they now were subject to losing large plots of land. For Guatemalan elites, rising 
conflict threatened established economic, social, and political interests. As Cindy Forster 
mentions, “Challenging the ‘Octopus’ set off a chain reaction among North Americans whose 
connections led to the highest halls of power in Washington D.C.”52 Amidst the Cold War’s 
heightened anticommunist sentiment, the United States made preserving hemispheric stability a 
high priority. United States government officials viewed these reforms “as Soviet-inspired” that 
needed to be eradicated, however the protection of their investments in the UFCO also played a 
factor in aiding Guatemala’s elites to remove the “internal enemy.”53  
The revolutionary period came to an end, reversing the agrarian reforms and leaving the 
poor “with only a memory of earlier gains.”54 Political agitation, propaganda, and rumors were 
tactics used to destabilize and demoralize Arbenz supporters and create discord within his 
military, a form of “psychological warfare” taught by the US Central Intelligence Agency 
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(CIA).55 Arbenz was forced into exile causing his cadets and young officers to unsuccessfully 
attack liberacionistas. Árbenz’s army agreed to surrender in order to avoid punishment. The 
state’s “formal ‘countersubversion’ bodies” conducted post-Árbenz purges that resulted in the 
detention of 9,000 people and forced into exile another 10,000, while countless civilians were 
arrested, tortured, and killed.56 Radio stations were used to broadcast warnings commonly 
containing anticommunist rhetoric. This form of intimidation was used to keep any opposition at 
bay. Following the Arbenz coup, Greg Grandin points out, the United States “promised that it 
would turn Guatemala into a ‘showcase for democracy.’ Instead, it created a laboratory of 
repression.”57 The atmosphere in Guatemala no longer resembled that of other nations during this 
period, such as Mexico,58 who continued to act on  the economic and political requests of their 
citizens, in turn creating a strong national allegiance, Guatemala relinquished nothing.59 By the 
1960s the motto of the military was “If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the 
problem,” there were no more negotiations between the state and dissatisfied Mayans.60 
Historian Kirsten Weld notes that a new special unit within the national police titled Special 
Investigation Bureau, created by US advisors in 1960, was to be given the authority to 
“apprehend anyone suspected of ‘crimes threatening constitutional government,’ in addition a 
central records bureau would collect, file, and examine fingerprints, arrest records, photographs, 
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personnel description etc. that help track those accused of criminal activity.”61 Though, Weld 
states, “what sounded like routine policing—keeping track of lawbreakers—took a sinister cast 
when designed primarily to apply to those with ‘political interest contrary to the interests of the 
country,” which was returning Guatemala’s status-quo.62 The existing state of affairs put 
Guatemala in a position of uncertainty as the wealthy elites depended on obedience of the other 
classes (Mayans, poor/middle class ladinos, students, and clergy) in order to maintain the 
country’s political and economic stability, thus any contrasting view to that of the states was to 
be crushed. In 1967, when these Special Investigation Bureau fused a Master File Registry was 
devised for the purpose of providing a more detailed category of searches such as “Communist 
Agitators,” “Subversives,” “University Campus,” “Demonstration,” and “Cadavers,” a urban 
counterinsurgency approach 63 Once Carlos Castillo Armas took office the shift of powers was 
drastically felt throughout the rural communities as, yet again, Mayans and ladino poor were 
placed back at the bottom of society as oppression intensified. This turn of events, however, was 
what provoked Mayans to begin organizing and resisting the oppressive state’s methods of 
control. In turn, the US government increasingly provided the Guatemalan state with military aid 
and training to withstand any enemy of the state, simply labelled as “subversives.”64 The Escuela 
Politécnica was once again taken under the wing of US officers, as it was during Ubicio’s rule, 
training Guatemalan officers in counterinsurgency tactics.65  
 The 13 November revolt of 1960 marked the beginning of the guerrilla-state struggle in 
Guatemala. This was an uprising of more than 30 percent of army units that was comprised of 
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120 left-leaning junior officers attempting to stage a takeover in the fight for constitutional 
equality for all and against the meddling of US imperialist (los gringos imperialistas).66 As the 
army openly made a way for Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to take office in 1958, internal strife 
among the officers escalated. Though, according to the CEH, divergent interests were expressed 
within the Army since 1954. REMHI describes, the Company of Children of Jesus was among 
one of the largest groups of military men who debated political and economic conditions in 
Guatemala.67 A clandestine group whose officers opposed Ydígoras decision to permit the CIA’s 
covert commissioning of Guatemalan officers to train the “antifidelista Brigade 2506 on 
Guatemala soil…for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs.”68 
The government successfully suppressed the planned coup to take down Ydígoras one 
week after rebel forces assembled at Puerto Barrios military base. As a result, 21 percent of all 
rebel officers were court marshalled; however, many officers escaped. 69 Lieutenants Luis 
Agosto Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, who had recently completed 
counterinsurgency training, escaped and in turn formed the guerrilla movements were.70 It would 
be Yon Sosa in August of 1961 who would declare the MR-1371 guerrilla movement. Soon after 
the joining of Fuerzas Armandas Rebeldes (FAR), the Guatemalan Labor (communist) Party of 
the military wing (PGT), and students from the Frente Revolucionarios 12 de abril with MR-13 
became the first insurgents who were taken in by poor ladinos who formed ties with Kechi 
Indians.72 As mass mobilization gained strength throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the new 
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militarized state needed to introduce the United States’ “new repressive technologies to 
nationalize violence,” as they lacked the skills and strength to withstand resistance.73 The state, 
largely dominated by the Guatemalan army, became increasingly violent toward “reformist 
politicians, the radicalized Catholic Church, Indigenous activist, and a revived labor and present 
movement [that] swelled the ranks of [the] left-wing insurgency that, by the end of the decade, 
was operating in eighteen of Guatemala's twenty-two departments.”74  
 In 1965, application of Operacion Limpieza (Operation Cleansing) by US security 
advisor John Logan provided training in, as Grandin notes, a “mastermind campaign against 
terrorists which would have access to all information from law enforcement agencies.”75 The 
ruthless Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque, who was put in charge of this operation, carried out 
widespread raids two months into the operation. Grandin notes that in February of 1966 “eight 
operations and a number of extrajudicial executions had taken place,” and by early March 
Bosque conducted the “largest catch: over thirty leftists captured, interrogated, tortured, and 
executed.” Grandin adds, “their bodies placed in sacks and dropped into the Pacific from the 
U.S.-supplied helicopters.”76 Campaigns like Operacion Limpieza were a clear indication of the 
Guatemalan government’s willingness to use excessive measures in order to subdue those 
identified as “internal enemy.”77 Shortly after Bosque’s campaign he carried out the first 
scorched-earth operation in March of 1966 as counterinsurgency escalated.78 The General Policy 
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within the CEH documents notes that the counterinsurgent war manual identified two groups as 
the internal enemy: “1) Those who challenged the established order by means of illegal actions 
and represented ‘revolutionary communists,’” and “2) those who, while not being communists, 
still challenged the established order.”79 Going against the unjust system of government was a 
necessary action Mayans needed to take as the systematic terror began ravaging their homes and 
murdering their families at an increasing rate. Peaceful protest was met with excessive military 
violence, therefore, Mayan men and women along with ladino supporters were forced to form 
armed revolts against the oppressive Guatemalan state. In compliance with the Doctrine of 
National Security, the army “defined the ‘annihilation of the internal enemy’ as a strategic 
objective of the counterinsurgency war.”80 By the late 1960s the army had shifted from being a 
unit that operated under the state to contain civilians to an entity that assumed control of the 
entire state.81 
 1966 also brought on the emergence of death squads, an operational branch of 
intelligence, whose purpose was to infiltrate communities suspected of guerrilla involvement or 
support, and spread psychological terror through threats, torturers, and executions. La Mano 
Blanca82 (White Hand) was the first death squad to justify its brutal action with the aim of 
eradicating communism.83 The CEH analysis of a declassified US document indicated that death 
squads were not autonomous structures of the army; more accurately they were “clandestine 
structures of Intelligence.”84 Furthermore, CEH testimony explains that these cover up names 
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were to protect government structures or state agents from being blamed for the massive human 
rights violations that played out. One ex-soldier testified: 
Nunca se ha movido la hoja de un roble sin orden del Ejército. La Mano Blanca, 
Jaguar Justiciero, Nueva Organización Anticomunista, eran inventos del Ejército.  
 
Tienen muchos nombres ... Todo esto es una construcción de la cúpula militar. 
Ellos dan diferentes nombres, como quien dice, son muchas personas civiles que 
están apoyando a los militares, pero es mentira. Son los mismos militares que se 
hacen pasar por otros grupos para hacer o cometer las fechorías que han hecho en 
Guatemala.  
 
Mano Blanca, que es lo mismo que el escuadrón de la muerte. Son ejecutores del 
Ejército. Estos pertenecen a la Sección de Inteligencia G-2 y S-2, que es lo 
mismo. 
 
The leaf of an oak has never been moved without an order from the Army. The 
Mano Blanca, Jaguar Justiciero, New Anti-Communist Organization, were 
inventions of the Army.85  
 
They have many names ... This is all a construction of the military dome. They 
give different names, as to say, there are many civilians who are supporting the 
military, but it is a lie. They are the same soldiers who pose as other groups to do 
or commit the misdeeds they have made in Guatemala.86  
 
Mano Blanca, which is the same as the death squad. They are executors of the 
Army. These belong to the G-2 and Intelligence Section, which is the same.87 
 
In 1970, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio was appointed president by the Institute 
Democratic party (PID), a party dominated by the military, that provided the state with a “façade 
of democratic politics, marked by periodic elections.”88 Military domination of the government 
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during this period allowed counterinsurgency operations to gain hegemonic status of state and 
civilian institutions, while bolstering their unrelenting presence throughout the western 
highlands.89  By 1978, under President-General Romeo Lucas Garcia, as the organization of rural 
communities grew and guerrilla activity swelled, the military repression deepened, which in turn 
led to massive bloodshed. Two years prior, following a massive earthquake that killed 20,000 
people and left one million homeless of which a majority were Mayan, Indigenous activists had 
already been exchanging their views on identity and rights of their people. This new thinking had 
created an awakening following the tremor that propelled Maya organizations and churches into 
examining the linkage between Indigenous population, poverty, and injustice. The Catholic 
Church began earnestly agitating for social justice for the marginalized poor and “pueblo 
Indígena.”90 Ricardo Cajas Mejía, one of Konefal’s interviewees from Quetzaltenango, stated 
“we didn’t know at the time that the earthquake, a national tragedy, could bring the unification of 
so many Indígenas.”91 In essence this tragedy integrated a Maya movement that spread a 
heightened awareness of the issues threatening the Indigenous communities.  
One of the first significant counterinsurgency attacks on Mayans took place in May 1978 
in the community of Panzós, Alta Verapaz when a massive group of Q’eqchi’ campesinos 
presented documents to the mayor regarding land that had been taken from them and protested 
for their land to be returned. The state fired into a crowd of not just the unarmed Q’eqchi’ men 
but women and children that were among the festival goers. Konefal describes chaos as 
campesinos attempted to escape into the hills and rivers as they were being chased and gunned 
down by army helicopters.92 She goes on to state, “It was a massacre on a scale not yet seen in 
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Guatemala’s civil war,” though this type of violence would soon become the new normal form of 
combat between the state and Mayans.93 Indigenous resistance transformed into a more armed 
resistance as systemic repression began wiping out Mayans with an unwavering force. Lucas’ 
regime murdered 35,000 civilians in the highlands and Guatemala City of which a majority were 
unarmed. 94  The military demand for new leadership led to his removal by means of a coup 
operated by young CEM officers and special forces-trained intelligence officers in March of 
1982.95 
 “I was called to put everything in order,” General Rios Montt stated in 1982 when he took his 
place as head of a triumvirate military junta.96 Montt’s objective was to continue the 
counterinsurgency fight with a more methodical and effective approach than former president 
Lucas García. Shortly thereafter, Rios Montt would drop the junta and appoint himself president 
of Guatemala. His leadership guided the nation into the grimmest, most vicious period of the 
civil war. Rios Montt’s aim, as he stated in his weekly televised addresses to the nation, was to 
carry out a campaign that would separate insurgents from rural civilians in order to “surgically 
excise evil from Guatemala, and ‘dry up the human sea in which the guerrilla fish swim.’” This 
would be realized under the Pacification campaign (initially called Operation Ashes, later 
dubbed la pacificasión).97 The separation of rural civilians from the “enemy” would not play out 
as planned, as these communities were perceived to be guerrilla bases who supported rebel 
activity, and for that reason, the land was to be scorched and its inhabitants exterminated. An 
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officer interviewed by Schirmer explained how, at the general staff headquarters, there were 
drawing boards to distinguish each rural village with a color. For example, the interviewee 
describes, “‘red zones’ were in enemy territory: no distinction was made between guerrilleros 
and their peasant supporters…The ‘pink zones’ were attacked but left standing, and those ‘white 
zones’… ‘safe villages’ to be left alone.”98 The red zones were called matazonas (kill zones). 
The military strategy was to disappear entire communities while instilling terror among 
surrounding communities.  
 The senseless acts of violence during the peak of the war (1981-1983) delivered a blow to the 
Mayan population. By December of 1982 the heavy hand of Rios Montt’s “Pacification” of the 
highlands reconfigured the social, economic, and physical structure of Mayan existence.99 As a 
result, the campaign left an estimated 250,000 to 1 million displaced.100 In 1983, Rios Montt was 
removed from office by a coup that brought in Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores (1983- 1986). 
Despite this change of leadership, President Mejia continued to carry out the “Pacification” 
campaign that further devastated rural Mayan communities. 
Gender, Masculinity, and War 
 Gender-based violence has been used throughout history as a terror tactic of war, a 
method to intimidate and control a people. REMHI explains that acts of rape, torture, and bodily 
mutilation carried out by government forces were used as ways to “degrade women through their 
sexuality, to show the highest contempt for their dignity as a people, and to use the intimate 
aspects of womanhood to add measures of exemplary terror.”101 The public spectacles of mass 
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rape “reinforced a spirit of machista complicity and extol power and authority as ‘masculine’ 
traits.”102 Rape and other modes of sexual violence were “weapons of war,” by which 
perpetrators, who epitomized dominant masculinity, exercised their power to maintain the 
subordination of Indigenous women, and in some cases Indigenous men. Cindy Forster 
highlights a testimony given by Estela (pseudonym), a Maya woman who remembered the 
violence that Indigenous women and men both faced.  
El terror dejó traumada una población entera, también femenizó a todos los 
individuos denominados subversivos. Eran vistos como recipientes de todo 
mal como la Eva bíblica y sus hijas. Tal es el caso de los capturados, ya que 
por toda Latinoamérica los presos políticos inspiraban un profundo odio y 
hasta el temor en sus victimarios, que no tiene explicación sin recurrir a lo 
simbólico. Los prisioneros masculinos fueron tratados como mujeres y las 
mujeres tratadas como putas, ambos torturados en sus partes sexuales y sus 
identidades de género. Tanto los hombres como las mujeres sufrieron 
repetidas violaciones en las llamadas cárceles clandestinas103   
 
The terror left an entire population traumatized, and it also feminized all 
individuals labeled subversive. They were seen as recipients of all evil, like 
Eve and her daughters in the Bible. Such is the case, throughout all of Latin 
America, with those captured, because political prisoners inspired a deep 
hatred and even fear in their oppressors, who had no explanation [for their 
actions] without resorting to symbols. Male prisoners were treated like 
women and women were treated like whores, tortured both on their sexual 
organs and [with regard to their] gender identities. Men as well as women 
suffered repeated rapes in the so-called clandestine jails. 
 
 Sexual attacks on men were performed with the intent to emasculate and feminize, 
causing them to experience the devaluation, contempt, and humiliation that women suffered. 
Though state social structures maintained hierarchical and patriarchal control, and race and 
class separated Maya men from ladinos, Indigenous men held a higher rank than women 
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within their communities. Acts of rape or sexual torture were meant to eliminate Indigenous 
men’s honor while positioning them alongside the ranks of women. These methods of 
violence, for men, were largely done for the purpose of extracting knowledge about 
insurgents’ whereabouts or to pinpoint allies of rebel forces. Secret houses served as 
clandestine prisons operated by the army and used to interrogate and torture men and women 
for weeks or even months, which nearly always resulted in death.104 REMHI gathered 
testimony that revealed protracted detentions within clandestine prisons, including torture 
and interrogations of the worst kind.105 Orders to execute these acts of violence were handed 
down by the “highest authorities of the State” who put into effect “institutional policy” that 
would “ensur[e] impenetrable impunity.”106  
 An occurrence in the community of San Andres illustrates the callous nature of the 
military as they carried out an attack on innocent villagers for the purpose of discouraging 
support for guerrillas in the area. Following the sound of an explosion nearby, military men 
entered the village making accusations of guerrilla support. Without warrant or reluctance, 
they shot and killed a 60-year-old woman. Shortly thereafter, the campesinos made the 
following discovery: 
... después descubrieron que en la vecindad habían matado ya a once personas, 
previamente torturadas, colocaron estacas en el piso donde sentaron a los hombres 
hasta que las mismas les salían por la boca, les cortaron la lengua, las partes nobles y 
parte de la cabeza a modo de huacal... - C 361. Enero, 1982. San Andrés Itzapa, 
Chimaltenango107 
 
…later they discovered eleven people in the vicinity who had been first tortured then 
murdered, they put stakes into the ground and sat the men on them until [the stakes] 
came out of their mouths, they cut off their tongues, their noble parts, and part of their 
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heads cut open like a huacal…108 -Case 361. January, 1982. San Andrés Itzapa, 
Chimaltenango 
 
Grandin tells of a similar case in 1982 in the village of Sechaj,a department of Alta 
Verapaz, where a PAC member detained, assaulted, and tortured a PGT109 activist, Fransisco Xi, 
before handing him over to a soldier who “amputated his tongue and testicles and put them on 
public display,” wounds that led to his eventual death.110 This sent a clear message, “rendering 
[him] impotent of voice and virility,” a direct attack of his manhood and a threat to those who 
sided with insurgents.111 It was military practice to make examples out of whole villages. There 
was no innocent or guilty, all poor Mayas were blameworthy. 
 Notably, Chimaltenango, north and south Quiché, and northern Huehuetenango 
experienced massive destruction as the military followed the trail of the EPG. These villages 
were tagged as “red zones” therefore whoever and whatever was in the path of the military upon 
arrival “were massacred by being tortured, raped, garroted, killed with machete, hacked or 
bashed to death, shot or burned alive.”112  
 Militarization of the countryside in 1981 became a new ploy to penetrate the social 
fabric of Mayan communities while suppressing insurgent alliances through forced 
membership in the Patrulla de Autodefensa Civil or PAC (Civil Defense Patrol). Konefal 
states PAC members were assigned to Mayan communities to be the eyes and ears of the 
military while also forced to “participat[e] in rural terror.”113 Alison Crosby and M. Brinton 
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Lykes further elaborate by explaining how PAC members were “expected to betray and 
inflict harm on their own community members,…many were tortured and beaten, and some 
were forced to witness the rapes of their wives and other women.”114 Many of the men 
expressed “losing their masculine and indigenous authority as community leaders,” 
“[evidence] of the intersection of victim and perpetrator indigenous men [experienced] 
during war.”115 Villages were ravaged and men were kidnapped and forced into serving the 
state as civil PAC or were “disappeared.” A prime example of this can be seen in Crosby and 
Lykes’s investigation into the lives of fifteen Mayan women who were taken to the military 
outpost of Sepur Zarco in northeastern Guatemala in 1982. An army patrol removed their 
husbands from their village over land disputes, leaving women alone and unprotected. 
Zarco’s military outpost was one of the “model villages” built for the military, and patrolmen 
used it as a place to relax while having all their needs taken care before returning to their 
duties. Twelve out of the fifteen women interviewed said they were ordered to “serve” at 
Sepur Zarco’s outpost.116 As reported by Konefal, “by the end of 1983 1.3 million Maya men 
took part in patrol [PAC] nearly 17 percent of Guatemala’s population,” and women were 
made into sexual and domestic slaves at these “special” outpost from 1982 to 1986.117  
These attacks began strategically targeting women, elders, and children during raids. 
Kaibiles would often dress as guerrillas and infiltrate communities asking for food, and when it 
was delivered the communities would be accused of being guerrilla supporters. Dos Erres was a 
remote village in Petén that experienced the army’s blatant disregard for Mayan life in December 
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of 1982 when they had been accused by another community of being guerrilla sympathizers and 
the ones who fostered the rebels who had previously ambushed and killed 21 soldiers and 
stealing 19 of their rifles.118 Kaibiles invaded the Dos Erres village massacring all. The women 
and children were taken to the church while the men were locked away in the schools. The 
Kaibiles search for their rifles and guerrilla propaganda, but their search was unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless, their orders to “vaccinate”119 the Mayans were carried out. According to CEH, all 
children were killed with a sledgehammer to the head and tossed into a dry well, while babies 
were grabbed by their feet and swung against trees or walls before also being tossed in. 
Testimony given to the CEH stated that some specialists began to rape underage girls, resulting 
in the death of many.120 Men, women, and elders were all pushed into the well one by one, and 
when no more could fit, many still alive screaming for help and trying to claw their way out, the 
patrol ravaged them with bullets. The killing, rape, and torture went on for days; one former 
Kaibil testified to the CEH that soldiers would go back and repeatedly rape the women even as 
they fought to resist their abuses.121 The CEH located in the court records the testimony of a 
direct witness that also expressed the ferocious nature of the Kaibiles detailing how they would 
cause pregnant women to have abortions by beating their stomachs incessantly, he states,“[y]ou 
could see how they beat them in the belly with weapons, or put them to bed and the soldiers 
jumped at them over and over again until the boy was bummed out.”122 The CEH concluded that 
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350 inhabitants were annihilated, resulting in the total extermination of the Dos Erres 
community. 
 Many Indigenous men, like PAC members, were traumatized from carrying out attacks 
on their own people. However, Konefal notes that their compliance was a form of self-
defense. Schirmer further explains how PAC members feared that if they did not obey 
military orders, their families would be punished and their villages would be sacked. 
PACs were made up of thousands of civilians forcibly conscripted into platoons, rarely 
trained, and typically only equipped with machetes and clubs, as they patrolled villages, 
attacked guerrillas, and played the role of secret informers to the army.123  
 Victor Montejo, a ladino schoolteacher in the remote pueblo of Tzalalá, gave a telling 
testimony of his experience with the collision between the army and a PAC. Both the 
army and the civil patrol mistakenly thought the other was a guerrilla force on attack. 
Montejo was subjected to extreme scrutiny by armed forces and taken back to the city 
barracks for further interrogation. Fearful of what his fate might be, he sat silently forced 
to listened to the howls of a man being tortured until sounds grew faint. In a moment of 
reflection, he could not grasp just how these soldiers could so callously carry out such 
orders. “Why was it…that the soldiers harbor so much hatred in their hearts and behave 
so drastically towards their own people?” Montejo questioned.124 Montejo recalled a 
conversation he had with an old friend, an ex-soldier, and he explained to him how 
soldiers performed:  
“[T]hey brainwash and indoctrinated them in such a way that [they] could 
torture [their] own parents, if they were ordered to,” he continues, “I spent 
three years in the barracks, and what did I learn? Fucking zero! The only 
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thing they taught is to kill and kill, again and again...you soon want to start 
making bullets fly, as if to say, it makes you feel real macho and no one can 
stand in your way.”125  
 
 Impunity had always played a role in the power that government-trained 
counterinsurgents exerted during the intrusion and extermination of Mayan communities. 
Elizabeth Oglesby points out that in sociologist Matilde González Izás’ analysis of oral history 
collected in a province of El Quiché “shows how local authority figures such as military 
commissioners and civil-patrol commanders were granted arbitrary power over life and death,” 
she explains, “[p]art of the way this power was exercised was through the conquest of women’s 
bodies.”126 The army and PAC commanders used rape as a way disparage their womanhood by 
breaking them down physically and mentally, and to keep them from one day speaking about 
what they had done.127 
War and Violence against Women and Children 
  Research has shown that the sexual and psychological abuse of Maya women has 
been constant throughout Guatemala’s history. Cindy Forster explains in her work that men 
used rape as a way to “enforce domination and maintain submission.”128 Between 1936 and 
1956, the majority of rape claims went undocumented and unpunished, essentially permitting 
offenders to abuse again.129 Male privilege, regardless of class or race, made it difficult for 
women to bring criminal charges against their abusers. Nonetheless, Mayan women found 
ways to resist the ethnic and national patriarchal structures imposed on them. According to 
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Forster, “rape b[ore] accurate witness to the limitations Guatemalan society placed upon 
women and the points at which it denied women the rights and personal dignity considered 
the birthright of males.”130 
 From 1962-1996, rape was an extensive counterinsurgency policy and systematic 
practice in which 99 percent of the victims were women, an estimated 89 percent of whom 
were Mayan women.131 A majority of these rapes happened during the heightened conflict of 
the early 1980s. Found in Rigoberta Menchú’s testimony is a detailed description of the 
kidnapping, extensive torture, and murder of her mother, Juana Tum. Menchú uses her story 
as an example of the countless inhumane acts of violence that not just her mother endured but 
all Mayan women during this period. In 1979, Menchú’s family had dispersed into different 
villages because they were being hunted by the government, for being “communist” and a 
“bad influence” that needed to be “weed[ed] out.”132 In the end nearly all of Menchú’s family 
had been killed at the hands of the state. As agonizing and traumatic as it was for Menchú to 
experience so much loss, each tragedy regenerated in her the urgency to not just mobilize but 
to make the other Mayans aware of the importance of their participation in the fight against 
the state. Though Anthropologist David Stoll believed, through his analysis of Menchú’s 
account, that her mother’s rape and killing was dramatized and questioned Menchú’s 
authenticity, the reality was that her mother was among 89 percent of Mayan women who 
were raped and often killed. Rape constituted a systematic practice that reached an 
unprecedented level of barbarity during the 1980s. Her oral account was not just a narrative 
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of her lived experiences but one of Mayans collectively. Menchú, in her testimony, I, 
Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, opens by stating; 
I’d like to stress that it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my 
people…The important thing is that what has happened to me has happened to 
many other people too: my story is the story of all poor Guatemalans. My 
personal experience is the reality of a whole people.133 
 
In his book, Who Is Rigoberta Menchú?, Grandin notes the important political role Menchú’s 
book played; “the political success of the book, its unexpectedly wild popularity in Europe and 
the US, actually strengthened the non-militarist wing of the insurgents, which was able to use the 
attention of the book focused on Guatemala to create a political space that allowed for negotiated 
end to the countries prolonged civil war.”134 Despite any omissions or exaggerations in 
Menchú’s narrative, REMHI confirms that “torture sessions frequently were held in public, in 
front of relatives and neighbors, as a form of exemplary terror. Many torture victims were 
subsequently killed.”135 Scenes like what Menchú described was common throughout armed 
conflict, it was a part of the state’s “methodology of horror.”   
 The systemic assaults of the 1980s were unleashed on Mayan communities where 
deliberate attacks on Indigenous women became a common practice. The senseless acts of 
violence during the peak of the war (1981-1983) delivered a blow to the Mayan population. By 
December of 1982 the heavy hand of Rios Montt’s military “Pacification” of the highlands 
reconfigured the social, economic, and physical organization of Mayan existence in the.136 The 
campaign left an estimated 250,000 to 1 million displaced in the highlands.137 In 1983, Rios 
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Montt was removed from office by a coup that brought in Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores 
(1983-1986) a Guatemalan Christian Democracy. 
  REMHI gathered accounts from witnesses of sexual assaults, “a form of violence against 
women that was employed in a variety of situations during abductions and detentions, massacres, 
military operations, and so on."138 REMHI concluded that one of every six massacre cases they 
investigated, “the rape of women was part of soldiers and civil patrols’ modus operandi…female 
bodies were just seen as just one more possession.”139 Raping of Maya women represented a 
continued systematic denial of female rights. In many cases women were raped by multiple men 
and left crippled from how savagely they were handled, and their children made to bear witness. 
Alison Crosby, who interviewed 54 Maya women from different zones of Guatemala, reveals 
that each one was subjected to rape, some multiple times, in front of their children “or when they 
themselves were still children and their mothers were forced to watch.”140 Forced separations left 
women to suffer psychological and physical traumas. The CEH collected evidence regarding ex-
military men, who served in areas of heightened conflict during the war, explaining what they 
would do with the children whose lives they spared. The following testimony was of an ex-
military man describing the scene after an encounter with guerrilla forces that left civilians dead 
and their children now orphaned. 
“quedan niños vivos, ¿qué se hace con un niño de esos?, ¿qué haría usted? ¡Recogerlo! 
… el Ejército sí los jaló”141 
 
“A los dos niños los llevaron al pueblo y los regalaron a la gente … 
cuando capturaban a niños y no los mataban de una vez, así hacían 
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con ellos, regalarlos a la gente en los pueblos.”142 C 3559. Octubre, 1983. San Juan 
Cotzal, Quiche 
 
“children are left alive, what do you do with one of those children? What would you do? 
Take him! … The Army indeed took them all.”  
 
“They took the two children to town and gave them to the people ... 
when they captured children and didn't kill them all at once, that's 
what they did with them, give them away to the people in the 
villages.” C 3559. October, 1983. San Juan Cotzal, Quiche 
 
 Death squads like Kaibiles, were especially brutal to women and children as their 
objective was to eliminate every source of life.143 One instance in the village Barilla, 
Huehuetenago an eight-month pregnant woman was cut open, her unborn child removed and 
subsequently tossed around.144 It was their way of destroying the seed that would cultivate more 
of, as the military saw it, the enemy. As Etelle Higonnet explains her analysis of the genocide 
portion of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) report in Quiet Genocide, “women 
were not simply [considered] biological reproducers, but transmitters of a cultural values to a 
new generation. If the women are affected, then the community as a whole is deeply shaken.”145 
Rachel Nolan’s research on adoption in Guatemala during the war shows that the Guatemalan 
state set out to “terminate the seed of future guerrilla fighters” through kidnapping and 
disappearing children.146 The state took advantage of parents in rural communities in which 
mothers were lied to, tricked, intimidated, or threatened with violence so they would surrender 
their children to social workers. Violence against mothers was, in effect, violence against their 
children given that their survival was dependent on them. Nolan points out that a “majority of 
disappeared children were indigenous, which coincided with the first objective [of the state]. The 
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result of removing Indigenous children from their families was to ‘create general terror’ and to 
‘make a profit from the sale of children,’” and again to “stamp out a ‘bad seed’ through the 
appropriation of children.”147 Mayan children were seen “as racially mutable through placement 
with families in Guatemala and abroad,” essentially “children, unlike adults, could be redeemed 
if they were replanted in the right soil with proper couples” who were non-Communist.148 
Operations were ordered by the government through the efforts of social workers to cleanse the 
Guatemalan race by killing or destroying the women who progenerate the future of Mayans and 
extract children who were young enough to mold.  Campaigns like these were a more direct part 
of genocide—a way to permanently remove Indian culture.  
Agency  
 
“It wasn’t that it couldn’t be done, it was that we dared to do it.” - Stated by a Mayan 
woman in an interview documented in REMHI149 
 
In the face of incessant violence, Mayan women found ways of resisting the triple yoke 
of oppression imposed by the state. Class and race were intertwined with gender oppression that 
resulted in women not only being demoralized for being women, but for existing as poor Mayan 
women. Indigenous women were born into a culture and a nation deeply rooted in a patriarchal 
power system that bolstered male authority and preserved women’s subordinate position. As 
historian David Carey points out, Indigenous women “were neither autonomous nor powerless; 
they made history, but not under the circumstances of their choosing.”150 The intensity in which 
the state had begun moving through rural Guatemala massacring villages, raping women, 
torturing, and disappearing hundreds of innocent people, women began realizing they could not 
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solely depend on the men within their communities to organize and fight, but they too needed to 
participate in their struggle. It was necessary for women to prevail over their pain and the deaths 
they had witnessed. As Menchú shares in her testimony, the sorrow she felt after losing her 
brother and parents was difficult to bear, but that grief was not only hers to carry, it was also the 
grief of all Mayans who had experienced loss or were subjected to violence. In a conversation 
with her little sister, she recalled her saying that the death of their parents (and all compañeros) 
was the reason for their fight, her sister asserts, “we must be like revolutionary women [and] a 
revolutionary isn’t born out of something good, he is born out of wretchedness and bitterness,” 
she continues, but “[their loss] gives us one more reason…to fight without measuring our 
suffering, or what we experience, or thinking about the monstrous things we must bear in life.”151  
The state’s attempt to intimidate, drive away or wipe away a people had failed. By the 
1980s, nearly a quarter of combatientes were women who left their children to go to the 
mountains (a subirse a la montaña) in order to train with the guerrillas. Menchú expresses the 
role women played in the war was extraordinary from fighting, secretly transposing documents, 
constructing barricades, or planting propaganda bombs and it was not for power but rather, as 
Menchú states, “so that something will be left for human beings. And this gives us the courage to 
be steadfast in the struggle, in spite of the danger.”152   
At the core of Indigenous cultural identity stood Mayan women as invaluable bearers of 
future generations as well as the pillars that sustained unity in the midst of conflict. REMHI’s 
documents corroborate the importance of women in the success of society stating, “women were 
the ones to repair broken social ties, preserving family cohesion even under the most adverse 
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conditions. They were the ones who preserved the essential ingredients for reestablishing life 
among groups of survivors.”153 For this reason, the extermination campaigns of women and 
children were a central component in the quest to destroy Indigenous identity. The state 
understood that without women, Mayans cease to exist, a strategy they imposed to obliterate a 
race. However, the state’s ploy to fracture Indigenous participation in the war was an effort 
rendered unsuccessful. As Menchú explains, “[b]efore everyone used to think that a leader had to 
be someone who knew how to read, write and prepare documents…saying ‘I am a leader, it’s my 
job to lead and yours to fight,’” but that was not the order of things within their organizations. 154 
What Indigenous people knew was enough, because along the way they learned from others what 
was necessary to fight against the state. Menchú’s mother expressed to her that women “too had 
to participate, so that when the repression comes and with it a lot of suffering, it’s not only men 
who suffer. Women must join the struggle [but] in their own way.”155 Forster reveals that women 
who worked in recruiting civilian women had to assure them it was in the best interest of their 
people to rise up against the tyranny of the state. Like in ex-combatant Adela’s testimony to 
Forster, in which  she explained how guerrillas from the very beginning had an important task to 
perform, they all had to become organizers who from time to time would make their way to the 
coastal areas giving political talks in an attempt to convince Mayans the importance in unifying 
for the betterment of their families and all Mayans.156 Another ex-combatant’s testimony, 
(pseudonym Patricia) was taken during the last phase of the war, which demonstrated how 
women had been persistent throughout the decades of kidnappings, massacres and torturing of 
their people. Patricia states: 
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Bajábamos así en las fincas. …Juntábamos a la gente. Algunos tenían miedo y los 
finqueros no lo gustaban. Vigilábamos también. Hay gente que sí apoyaba, y preguntaba. 
Primero ellos tenían miedo si uno es igual a los soldados. Nosotros aclaramos que no 
hacíamos daño a nadie. Hay señores que apoyaron. Iban a avisar así a donde estaban los 
soldados. Los finqueros tenían miedo, porque ellos no pagaban bien a los trabajadores, 
los discriminaron. También hablamos con los dueños. Ahora tiene que unirse, decíamos a 
los trabajadores, organizarse, porque si no se organice, no va a hacer nada. Los 
trabajadores tienen miedo porque si se organicen para formar su sindicato o para que 
respeten sus derechos, les corren. Yo digo que sólo con organizándose hay solución. 
Tiene que proponer propuestas y hacer manifestaciones para reclamar sus derechos. Si no 
hay unidad, no se puede lograr algo. 
 
 
We used to go down to the farms. … We brought people together. Some were afraid and 
the farmers did not like it. We kept watch too. There are people who did support, and 
asked. First they were afraid if one is equal to the soldiers. We clarified that we did not 
harm anyone. There are gentlemen who supported. They were going to tell where the 
soldiers were. The farmers were afraid, because they did not pay the workers well, they 
discriminated against them. We also spoke with the owners. Now is the time you all need 
to unite, we said to the workers, organize, because if you do not organize, nothing will 
change. The workers are afraid because if they organize to form their union or to respect 
their rights, they will be fired. I would say that there is solution through organizing. You 
have to propose proposals and make demonstrations to claim your rights. If there is no 
unity, nothing can be achieved. 
 
Many Indigenous women sacrificed a great deal by taking up arms and fighting alongside 
their compañeros. Forster documents an interview with Yolanda Colóm an Indigenous woman 
who describes their position among men stating, “It was a tradition that women were almost 
always collaborators. A kind of rearguard for parents, siblings, boyfriends, husbands, 
children.”157 In the mountain where the guerrillas trained gender did not matter. Forster points 
out how Elena’s testimony shows that women were treated as equals. Elena continues to 
elaborate about her position and respect given to women fighters: 
Tenía mi grado como teniente. Yo tengo que dar orden a ellos, algunas 30 
personas. A mí me emocionó mucho porque no todos tienen grado. A mí, sí, subí 
rápido, me alegré mucho. ¿Y por qué? [Los dirigentes] me dijeron que es por mi 
esfuerzo… [A su juicio como oficial], …la capacidad que tenemos es todo igual 
con el hombre. No hay uno menos ni más, todo igual. Por ejemplo en la comida, 
 




todos tuvimos igual. La única diferencia es que tiene más fuerza el hombre, pero 
cargamos igual, trabajamos igual, combatimos igual. Por la misma política los 
hombres tienen que tratarnos bien, cambiar su mentalidad.158 
 
I had the rank of lieutenant. I have to give orders to them, some 30 people. I was 
very moved because not everyone has a rank. To me, yes, I went up fast, I was 
very happy. And why? [The leaders] told me that it is because of my effort ... [In 
his opinion as an officer], ... the capacity we have is all the same with men. There 
is no one less or more, everything the same. For example with food, we all had 
the same. The only difference is that men are stronger, but we carry the same 
load, we work the same, we fight the same. By the same policy, men have to treat 
us well, change their mentality. 
 
This interviewee expressed the idea that men valued women equally. Elena goes further as to 
describe men taking on roles that were traditionally reserved for women. She explains, “the men 
learned how to wash their clothes, how to cook, how to do everything. Sweep, mop, change 
diapers. Everything changed.”159 Forester notes that even with all the hardships they encountered 
in the mountains, it was the one place poor women found their self-worth in brotherhood with 
men.”160  
The civil war worsened the status of women in Guatemala to the point where they took 
matters into their own hands. They had reached a stage in which approval or permission by 
males was something of the past. Mayan women took hold of their agency by not only taking up 
arms in the mountains, but they investigated, demonstrated, and organized against the 
accumulating human rights violations. Groups, spearheaded by women, like Mutual Support 
Group161 (GAM), served to locate the thousands of disappeared. According to REMHI, it was the 
“Mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters of the disappeared…who dared to defy the [military’s] 
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raging violence. Never before had they been considered protagonists in the political life of the 
country, yet they displayed courage, resolve, and hope on countless occasions.”162 GAM became 
the nucleus of many other social movements that protested and demonstrated against the 
injustices of the state. Women took on a trailblazing role of activism contributing to the greater 
social awareness of their demands. In an interviewed obtained by REMHI the tenacity and 
strength of women in the face of military forces is illustrated as followed: 
When we women began to call for our disappeared relatives, for life, for freedom 
from military dictatorship that totally dominated the country, then women's 
activism began to be more apparent. Even the army was surprised. It was 
unbelievable that these little women, these little girls, frail as they are, faced up to 
an army that has always been feared, do you understand me? That's when I think 
they began to realize that the participation of women is effective, that women are 
courageous. Because no one could believe that we women could face, harass, and 
chase away the army. At least that's how it was, it literally was like that: women 
chased the army away. It wasn't that it couldn't be done it was that we dared to do 
it.163 
The emergence of the Association of Families of the Disappeared and Detained of Guatemala 
(FAMDEGUA) in 1992 took their movement further by pushing for the investigations of 
massacres, accompaniment during exhumation, and demands for restitution.164 It was the 
pressure from FAMDEGUA that allowed for the exhumation of the Dos Erres village that was 
massacred in December of 1982.165 From 1994 to 1995 162 remains were rescued allowing these 
individuals’ lives to be acknowledged and allowing families to properly bury their loved ones 
with dignity and honor. 
These indigenous organizations emerged to take back their communities, repress military 
control, and to put pressure on the state to acknowledge the human rights violations committed. 
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The leadership roles that women took within these organizations in fighting and vocalizing their 
plight was instrumental in bringing international awareness to the gruesome conditions within 
Guatemala and their struggle against impunity. Leaders like Rigoberta Menchú, Helen Mack,166 
and Rosalina Tuyuc,167 just to name a few, are attributed to using their voice on behalf of 
Mayans in search of social justice while remaining steadfast in their cause. Among these women 
were many more who throughout the civil war who demonstrated an enormous capacity to avoid 
becoming discouraged, to pull themselves together, and undertake new strategies for the survival 
and success of all Mayans. 
Conclusion  
“We are avengers of death. Our race will never be extinguished while there is light in the 
morning star.” -written in Popol Vuh (Council book) by anonymous K’iche scribes in the mid-
1500s.168  
  Peace talks had been proposed by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
as early as 1986 but were denied by President Vinicio Cerezo. The UNRG had propositioned the 
removal and restructuring of security forces, however, Cerezo made clear there would be no 
dialog unless the URNG agreed to government amnesty.169 Since no agreement was made, the 
 
166 Helen Mack became a human rights activist following the death of her sister, anthropologist Myrna Mack, for 
publishing a report of the orchestrated displacements of rural Mayans. Helen Mack created a foundation in her 
sisters  which  became Guatemala’s “leading voice...on issues of human rights, justice, and accountability.”  
Elizabeth Oglesby, Introduction to “What is Reconciliation?” in The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011) p 450. 
167 Rosalina Tuyúc was cofounder of Guatemala’s widow organization CONAVIGU (Comité Nacional de Viudas de 
Guatemala) in 1988. She was a chief spokesperson for the reemerging left for women in search of their family who 
had been kidnapped or disappeared. This organization became crucial in “addressing critical problems of subsistence 
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denouncing all types of rights violations.” Konefal, For Every Indio, p168. 
168 Quote obtained in Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú?, p 284.  Popol Vuh, translated as the Council book but 
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oldest, most invaluable documentation of Mayan mythology and culture. Unknown K’iche’ authors, Popol Vuh in 
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government-sponsored policy of repression continued and intensified. A number of intimidation 
ploys against grassroot organizations were carried out in an attempt to deter the spread of 
international attention. Again in 1988, the URNG petitioned for a cessation of hostilities and yet 
once more their request for dialogue had been dismissed. It would take ten years before peace 
discussions would close, and armed confrontation between the Guatemalan Government and the 
left-wing guerrillas would end. In the early 1990s, the United Nations, with support from the 
international community, began mediating the long formal process of peace negotiation between 
the government and UNRG.170 These negotiations ultimately led to the signing of the Peace 
Accords on December 29, 1996 under President Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen that would halt the 
violence that had been ongoing for 36 years. Yet, as Jennifer Schirmer described, the signing of 
the Accords would not be the final obstacle, but rather the enactment and fulfilment of the Peace 
Accords presented the most challenges.171 Schirmer states in concluding her analysis of the 
military, “[the military’s] repressive habits of mind, and hegemonic power within at State of their 
own crafting will continue to haunt Guatemala into the twenty-first century, managing a violence 
that is a democracy only in name.”172 Interviews of former officers corroborated her closing 
analysis of the military’s mindset explaining their concern regarding the adverse factors of 
integrating Mayans into Guatemala’s political life. For example a lieutenant colonel in the 
Defense Ministry spoke of the advancement of the Pan-Maya organization stating, “for the next 
five to six years will only be run by Mayan intellectuals and academics, but in the medium term 
of twenty to twenty-five years, if it succeeds in homogenizing the differences within the Mayan 
 
170 CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, vol I, p 226, 227. REMHI also notes the international communities, also 
referred to as the “Group of Friends,” referenced were key countries Spain, United States, Mexico, and Norway. 
REMHI, Guatemala: Never Again!, p 283. 
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community and creates conditions for leadership, could become a political movement that forms 
the basis of a new political party in the twenty-first century.”173 Preventing former guerrilla 
members infiltration of the state’s political realm continued to form parts of the military’s new 
arsenal of subjugation into the twenty-first century.174 
Guatemala continued to experience conflict well beyond the 1996 Accords agreement. 
The agreement put forth a national reconciliation law for the disarmament of the guerrillas, 
however, this law reflected the interest of military amnesty. Military amnesty would allow for 
those who committed crimes during the war to be absolved from any future persecution.175 In 
addition, the concept of “reconciliation” was broadly addressed in this agreement through 
mentions of national unity, harmony, and solidarity, as the people still in power (elites of 
Guatemala) were not prepared for the extensive social, political, an institutional transformation 
necessary to achieve true reconciliation.176 What reconciliation meant to those power brokers 
was starting over without seeking revenge, in essence discounting the 36 years of bloodshed, 
tortures, rapes, kidnappings, and femicide that were largely experienced by Mayans. Yet, the 
trauma endured during the civil war demanded a deeper acknowledgment of what had transpired 
as well as extensive work in rebuilding the social fabric that was dismantled within their Mayan 
communities. Moving forward was especially difficult for women, particularly rural Maya 
women, who became targeted victims of a war that was not only about race and class but gender 
as well.  Women continued to experience violence and poverty as many were ostracized from 
their communities for being the victims of military rape. The truth-telling process that was 
incorporated into the Peace Accords was intended to unveil, through the thousands of testimonies 
 
173 Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 273. 
174 Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 273. 
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collected, the egregious human rights violations Mayans faced. Additionally, this process was 
created to help victims, turned protagonist, seek justice for all Mayans and heal from the 
dramatic consequences of their racialized gendered experiences.177  
The gross violations of human rights in genocidal proportions was concluded by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC). Both TRC reports, the Recovery of Historical 
Memory Project (REMHI) Guatemala: Never Again (1998) and the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH) A Memory of Silence (1999), authenticated the constructional and systematic 
nature of armed conflict. The CEH documented that 626 massacres were committed 
predominantly by the army, and reinforced by special groups like the Kaibiles.178 Attacks on 
Mayan communities were responsible for the displacement of anywhere between 500,000 and 
1.5 million people in Guatemala or beyond its borders.179 In the end the Guatemalan Civil War 
left more than 200,000 people dead of which 83 percent were Mayan. A deliberate attack on a 
race of people who had, since the states independence, only searched for equality from the 
minority of elite ladino population. 
The CEH states in it’s opening paragraph states, 
Guatemala is a country of contrasts and contradictions…[filled with pages that 
have been] written of shame and infamy, disgrace and terror, pain and grief, all as 
a product of the armed confrontation among brothers and sisters. For more than 34 
years, Guatemalans lived under the shadow of fear, death and disappearance as 
daily threats in the lives of ordinary citizens.180 
 
Yet, Mayans unified and fought to reestablish a country that once reflected a thriving 
“multiethnic, pluricultural and multilingual nation, in a State which emerged from the triumph of 
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liberal forces in Central America,” that had made strides towards equal distribution of wealth and 
rights.181 However, the fighting has not ceased as Mayan women and men continue to push the 
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